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Abstract 
Knowledge management has emerged as a very successful organization practice and has been 
extensively treated in a large body of academic work.  Surprisingly, however, organizational 
economics (i.e., transaction cost economics, agency theory, team theory and property rights 
theory) has played no role in the development of knowledge management.  We argue that 
organizational economics insights can further the theory and practice of knowledge management 
in several ways.  Specifically, we apply notions of contracting, team production, 
complementaries, hold-up, etc. to knowledge management issues (i.e., creating and integration 
knowledge, rewarding knowledge workers, etc.) , and derive refutable implications that are novel 
to the knowledge management field from our discussion.  
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1.  Knowledge Management: Perils and Promises 
During the last decade or so, knowledge management  a set of management activities, aimed at 
designing and influencing processes of knowledge creation and integration including processes of 
sharing knowledge (henceforth, “KM”)  has emerged as one of the most influential new 
organizational practices. Numerous companies have experimented with KM initiatives in order to 
improve their performance. At the same time, the literature on KM has virtually exploded (e.g., 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Choo, 1998; Boisot, 1998; Krogh, Ochijo, Nonaka, 2000; Easterby-
Smith, Crossan and Nicolini, 2000).  
 
KM would thus seem to be one of those areas, where managerial practice and the academic 
literature develop simultaneously and perhaps even co-evolve. Here KM is not much different 
from many other management fads of the recent decades, such as business process reengineering or 
total quality management that also promise to contribute to competitive advantage  although this 
is asserted rather than carefully demonstrated. The analogy goes further, for KM is also akin to 
these fads in that there is no clear disciplinary foundation of KM.  Indeed, the underpinnings of 
KM are a mixed bag, ranging from Eastern philosophical traditions over ideas from organizational 
behavior to notions from information science.  Strikingly (to us, at least), organizational economics 
plays no role in the disciplinary base of KM.  However, the KM literature neglects organizational 
economics at its peril.  
 
Organizational economics looks inside the firm by examining the tasks of motivating and 
coordinating human activity. It is taken up with explaining the nature of efficient organizational 
arrangements, and the determinants of such arrangements.  Efficiency is understood in the sense of 
maximizing the joint surplus from productive activities, including processes of creating, sharing 
and exploiting knowledge.  A basic proposition is that the costs and the benefits of productive 
activities  and therefore joint surplus  is influenced by the incentives, property rights and ways 
of disseminating and processing information that structure productive activities.   Perhaps as a 
result of organizational economics playing at best a small role in the evolution of KM, there is 
seldom any sustained attention to the cost of KM activities. For example, when Krogh, Ichijo and 
Nonaka (2000) in a major survey of the KM literature mention cost, they devote 4 pages (out of 
more than 250) to it, and then only treat costs of searching for knowledge, a category of cost that is 
only one among a multitude of relevant costs of KM.i  This neglect of organizational costs is quite 
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representative of the whole KM literature. Moreover, we would argue that even the potential 
benefits of alternative ways of organizing KM are ill-understood in the literature. On the 
managerial level, something similar may be observed. This is, perhaps, best expressed in the words 
of a knowledge manager, who recently stated to us that  
 
… [t]he concept of KM for mutual benefit seems self-evident for the enthusiasts, which 
only increases their puzzlement when others in their organization show apathy of even 
negative interest in the concept. If there is no offsetting benefit for sharing knowledge in 
terms of money and recognition, or the process by which one does so is arcane or 
bureaucratic, or it is difficult to find the right fora, then organizational costs rise and 
participation drops proportionally. 
 
Because neither the relevant costs of alternative ways of organizing knowledge in organizations, 
nor their benefits are addressed in any systematic manner in the KM literature, the attendant trade-
offs, and how these may be influenced by managerial action also remain ill-understood. The result 
is that the literature does not allow propositions about optimal KM strategies, and how these vary 
with changes in the relevant parameters, to be made.  In other words, in its present manifestation, 
the KM literature does not constitute a managerially relevant contingency framework; it may 
supply inspiration (and entertainment) for managers, but not much in the nature of firm guidance.  
 
Lest this be taken as a wholesale condemnation of KM, let us state immediately that the KM 
literature contains numerous salient observations on knowledge processes, that is, processes of 
creating, sharing and exploiting knowledge (e.g. Lyles and Schwenk, 1992; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995; von Krogh, Ochijo, Nonaka, 2000).  In addition, the literature does much to identify key 
characteristics of knowledge-structures that surround knowledge processes in terms of knowledge-
type, knowledge-distribution, complexity and relatedness (e.g. Lyles and Schwenk, 1992; Weick 
and Roberts, 1993; Galunic and Rodan, 1998).   In the present paper, we take some of these ideas 
as grist for a theoretical mill consisting of organizational economics. In particular, we focus on the 
coordination and incentive problems that processes of creating, sharing and exploiting knowledge 
inside firms may give rise to, and how various aspects of governance may be understood as a 
response to such problems. We thus take steps towards meeting the challenge contained in the 
recent observation that “… the time is ripe to start addressing learning and knowing in the light of 
inherent conflicts between shareholders’ goals, economic pressure, institutionalized professional 
interest and political agendas” (Easterby-Smith, Crossan and Nicolini, 2000: 793). 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we highlight key insights from 
organizational economics, and briefly sketch general implications for the understanding of KM 
practices (2. “Organizational Economics: A Novel Perspective on Knowledge Management”). 
Second, we show that novel propositions about KM may be derived from organizational 
economics. We also address from an organizational economics perspective a number of central 
phenomena (e.g. firm specific learning, teamwork, communities of practice, knowledge-
integration) that have been discussed in the KM literature (2. “Knowledge Management: 
Organizational Economics Insights” and Section IV. Conclusions follow.  A final reservation.  
Our chosen subject in this paper is a vast one.  Considerable narrowing of the issues is necessary 
for space reasons. Thus, in the following we disregard KM issues that relate to the issue of the 
boundaries of the firm (e.g., make-or-buy decisions, joint ventures, networks, etc), and focus solely 
on KM as it pertains to internal organization.ii  
 
2. Organizational Economics: A Novel Perspective in Knowledge Management 
 
2.1.  Overall 
Although organizational economics began as a theory of the existence and optimal scope of the 
firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975), during the last twenty years or so it has increasingly been 
applied to internal organization issues. In particular, organizational economics has directed 
attention to the coordination and incentive problems that are caused by the pathologies that 
unavoidably accompany an internal division of labor, such as asymmetric information, diluted 
performance incentives, measurement difficulties, bargaining problems, moral hazard, duplicative 
(redundant) efforts, etc. In turn, organizational economists have explained how a host of 
organizational arrangements, such as various kinds of authority, payment schemes, delegation of 
decision rights, etc., serve to alleviate the severity of such problems.   
 
Beginning our brief sampling of organizational economics perspectives, agency theory 
perspectives have predominantly addressed issues related to payment schemes (Holmström 1979, 
1982; delegation of decision rights (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Aghion 
and Tirole 1997), multitasking (Holmström and Milgrom 1991), and managerial commitment 
(Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999) under assumptions of moral hazard and asymmetric 
information. Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985, 1996), and property rights insights 
(Hart 1995) have been brought to bear on issues related to allocation of rights and design of 
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contracts when investments in human capital are firm-specific, agents may behave in an 
opportunistic manner, and contracts are incomplete. Team theory (Marschak and Radner, 1972; 
Casson, 1994; Carter, 1995) has addressed the optimal design of organizational structures, given 
the bounded rationality of individuals (but absent conflicts of interest). Finally, work on 
complementarities between organizational elements (e.g., payment schemes, delegation of rights, 
supervision methods, etc.) (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, 1995) has lend strong formal support to 
the traditional notion that there are stable, discrete governance structures that combine 
organizational elements in predictable ways (Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1996).  It is fair to say 
that the empirical base of organizational economics, in terms of the number of corroborations of 
predictions of these theories, is fairly strong (Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Prendergast, 1999).   
 
Although organizational economics is constituted by a number of different theories, nevertheless 
there are a number of common threads in the literature (cf. Foss, 2000). On the method level, all of 
organizational economics is unabashedly individualistic in the sense that all organizational 
phenomena should be explained as the outcome of the choice behavior of individual agents.  At the 
theoretical base, the whole literature is concerned with efficiency, that is to say, how resources are 
allocated so that they yield the maximum possible value. Two closely related implications follow 
immediately.  First, the organizational economics perspective is intimately taken up with value-
creation; as noted, maximizing the value that can be created is the meaning of economic efficiency.  
Second, since the allocation of resources is (also) a matter of how the relevant resources are 
governed and organized and since value-creation is dependent upon governance and organization, 
it follows that an efficiency perspective allows one to discriminate between alternative forms of 
economic organization in terms of efficiency. Rational actors will choose those organizational 
forms, contracts and governance structures that maximize their joint surplus and will find ways to 
split this surplus among them.   
 
In turn, the influence of alternative organizational arrangements on value-creation may be analyzed 
in terms of motivation, knowledge, information, and complementarity  and how alternative 
arrangements embody different ways of influencing these variables (cf. also Buckley and Carter, 
1996). Motivation, etc. are all in different ways related to those transaction costs that (in various 
guises) are central in all organizational economics theories, and whose size influences the value 
that may be created from organizing and governing scarce resources in particular ways. The value 
that can be created, in the presence of transaction costs, fall short of what may be created in a 
world with no problems of motivation, etc. (a “first-best”situation), and, hence, no transaction 
 4 
costs.  While such a world may be imagined, it is not the world of managers and other inhabitants 
of organizations.  However, motivation, etc. may be manipulated so that the organization 
approaches it.  We discuss motivation, knowledge and information, and the coordination of 
complementary actions seriatim in the following.   
 
2.2. Motivation 
The motivational assumptions of organizational economics have been subject to a good deal of 
scrutiny and critical discussion. Many scholars in, for example, organizational behavior, have been 
critical of the seemingly cynical assumptions with respect to human nature that drives much of 
organizational economics analysis. To these critics, opportunism (“self-interest seeking with 
guile,” Williamson, 1996) and moral hazard (i.e. using asymmetric information to one’s advantage 
and the other party’s disadvantage after a contract has been concluded) are not descriptively 
accurate. They may furthermore be “bad for practice” to the extent that managerial action based on 
prescriptions from these theories may, by treating people as would-be opportunists, lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies (Goshal and Moran, 1996). However, such motivational assumptions 
fundamentally serve to highlight the  presumably undisputed  fact that actors often have very 
different interests; opportunism and similar assumptions are stark ways of highlighting this.  
Moreover, the motivational assumptions serve to emphasize that economic organization need to be 
designed with an eye to the possibility that some (by no means all) actors may act in a morally 
hazardous or opportunistic manner.   
 
In the context of internal organization, the largest effort so far may well have been devoted to 
exploring how various aspects of internal organization  from accounting principles over payment 
methods to the nature and function of hierarchy itself  may be explained as efficient responses to 
various principal-agent problems.  Thus, particular attention has been paid to differences between 
input and output-based payment, and how the choice between these is determined by the 
observability of effort and states of nature; the role of monitoring and of subjective and objective 
performance measurement (Prendergast, 1999); and of how a hierarchical structure may constrain 
“rent-seeking,” that is, attempts to influence superiors to one’s own advantage (Milgrom, 1988).  
 
One perspective on all this is that various aspects of internal organization arise to curb the resource 
costs of agents pursuing their own interests in a way that is harmful to the organization. Under an 
organizational division of labor, management (and the owners of the firm) delegate some rights to 
employees, ranging from the trivial (the right to work with the company’s vacuum cleaner) to the 
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all-important (the right to make decisions on major investment projects). Management wishes these 
delegated rights to be exercised in an optimal manner. However, since the right holders cannot be 
constantly monitored, and since performance pay schemes trade-off incentives and risk, some 
losses (compared to a full-information situation) are usually unavoidable.   Internal organization 
arises as a trade-off between these losses and the costs of designing monitoring schemes, incentive 
contracts, etc.   
 
A particular set of incentive problems is caused by problems of managerial commitment.  For 
example, often employees wish to specialize their human capital to the firm, thus becoming more 
productive and hoping to capture some of the marginal productivity created.  In other words, they 
expect to be compensated for their investment. However, by specializing in this way, employees 
become subject to a potential hold-up problem (Williamson, 1985, 1996; Hart, 1995).  To be sure, 
the possession of specialized knowledge may be a strong bargaining lever. However, there is 
another strong party to the bargain situation, namely the firm to which the employee specializes.  
The implication is that employees cannot expect to capture all or even most of the quasi-rent from 
their specialized human capital investments, which harms incentives to undertake the investments 
(Hart, 1995).  Strong and credible managerial commitment to not using the hold-up option may 
solve the problem (Kreps, 1994).  Another way of solving the problem is to allocate (more) 
decision rights to employees who undertake human capital investments (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). Thus, in professional service firms, often employees with a long tenure and good 
demonstrated performance become partners.  A final managerial problem has to do with 
managerial interference in the business of agents to whom the same management have delegated 
rights (e.g., to run their own projects).  This “problem of selective intervention” (Williamson, 
1985) arises because it is often hard for management to commit to not interfere. For example, it is 
not possible to make a court enforceable contract to prevent managerial interference once decision 
rights have been delegated.  However, arbitrary intervention, the breaking of promises to not 
intervene, etc., all of which will often be very tempting for management, are very destructive for 
motivation (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1999; Foss, 2001a). 
These incentive problems are clearly relevant to the understanding of the costs of KM practices.  
To the extent that agents’ human capital investments consist in the gathering and building-up of 
specialized knowledge and skills, they are not likely to be willing to share the relevant knowledge 
and skills with other agents, unless they are properly compensated.  They are not going to give up a 
strong bargaining lever without compensation. However, it is often difficult to contract over 
knowledge and skills. Moreover, there is a fundamental problem of managerial commitment: Since 
 6 
it is difficult to write and enforce contracts between those employees who possess important 
specialized knowledge and the firm on the sharing of the knowledge and the compensation to the 
employees, it is tempting for management to renege on the promise after the sharing of knowledge 
has actually taken place.  Two implications of direct relevance for KM follow.  First, forced KM 
initiatives may well be experienced as hold-ups by those agents inside the firm who control 
specialized knowledge and skills. Their future investment incentives are harmed accordingly.  
Second, unless these agents can expect to be compensated they are unlikely to share their 
knowledge at all.  It is likely be that the best way to handle this (i.e., to invest in human capital and 
to share knowledge embodied in this capital) is by giving the relevant employees appropriate 
incentives, perhaps even making them partners through providing ownership rights.    
 
2.3. Asymmetric Knowledge and Information 
Even if agents can be motivated to take actions (i.e., exploit their decision rights) that are 
“incentive-compatible” with those of other agents or principals, there is still no guarantee that they 
also make optimal (i.e., value maximizing) choices.   Willingness is not the same as ability.   To 
some extent this is a problem of information transmission: Under an organizational division of 
labor, no agent inside the firm is likely to have all the information needed for making an optimal 
choice, and transmitting all of this information to him is prohibitively costly.  Delegation may arise 
as a cost economizing response to this.  However, it also a matter of the often fleeting, subjective 
and tacit character of knowledge  a favorite theme of the KM literature.  As Hayek (1945: 77-
78) famously argued:  
 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely 
by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The 
economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” 
resources − if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves 
the problem set by these “data”. It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of 
resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance 
only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. 
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Arguably, firms face this problem of dispersed knowledge to a smaller extent than societies do; 
however, it is still relevant to them.  Firms may cope with the problem in different ways.  Again, they 
may delegate decision rights so that these rights are co-aligned with those who possess the relevant 
knowledge, balancing the attendant benefits with the agency costs that are caused by delegation 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  However, knowledge sharing is an alternative to this.  Thus, rather than 
delegating decisions rights in order to better utilize local knowledge, the existing rights structure (i.e., 
existing authority relations, payment schemes, organizational structures, etc.) remains unchanged and 
the relevant knowledge is gathered and shared among those who can make profitable use of this 
knowledge.  Such knowledge sharing is, of course, a key focus of KM.  
 
However, in the KM literature, knowledge sharing is often discussed and endorsed without any 
examination of the alternative of delegating rights so that knowledge is better utilized in this way. 
An organizational economics perspective not only identifies the relevant (organizational) 
alternatives, but also allows us to say something about the costs and benefits of these alternatives.  
Thus, one obvious advantage of the knowledge-sharing alternative is that it does not necessarily 
involve any delegation of decision rights. Knowledge sharing, as portrayed in the KM literature, 
may therefore impose smaller agency costs on an organization than the alternative of delegating 
decision rights.  However, there are other costs to consider when the choice has to be made 
between the two alternative of knowledge sharing and delegating decision rights.  For whereas 
knowledge sharing that takes place within an existing organizational structure may not impose the 
same agency costs as delegating decision rights does, knowledge sharing is likely to impose higher 
costs of communicating, storing, retrieving, etc. knowledge than the delegation alternative.  The 
point is not here that specialized IT systems have to be set up in order to reach the goal of 
knowledge sharing.  Rather, the point is that knowledge sharing may introduce costs that are 
caused by the bounded rationality of individuals, that is, their limited ability to identify, absorb, 
process, remember, etc. knowledge. And, of course, there are costs associated with trying to 
transform knowledge that only exists in tacit form into an articulate form.  As Hayek (1945) 
argued, decentralization economizes on these costs. In firms, delegation may be an attractive 
means of economizing on the costs associated with bounded rationality and tacit knowledge 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992).  The bottomline is that a full assessment of what alternative is 
superior in a specific situation  the improved utilization of knowledge by means of knowledge 
sharing or by means of delegation of decision rights  turns on a number of costs that have to be 
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balanced against the relevant benefits.   In its present manifestation, the KM literature does  
identify neither the relevant alternatives, nor the relevant net benefits.   
 
2.4. The Coordination of Complementary Actions 
Even if agents can be motivated to take incentive-compatible actions and even if they possess the 
right information or knowledge (because they are specialists or because this information or 
knowledge is somehow transmitted to them), there is still a problem of coordinating actions inside 
the firm.  In particular, the more complementary actions are, the more closely they need to be 
coordinated.  Through the use of the price mechanism, markets cope well with the coordination 
problem (Hayek, 1945). However, the more complementary actions are, the more necessary is it to 
supplement the use of the price mechanism with other mechanisms, such as communication 
(Richardson, 1972).  Firms have only limited access to the price mechanism, but they may have 
privileged access to the mechanism of communication (relative to markets). In this perspective, 
one advantage of KM may actually be that it assists the coordination of complementary actions by 
spreading knowledge, effectively bringing about common knowledge conditions (see Foss, 2001b 
for such an argument). KM thus reduces what Koopmans (1957: 162-163), referred to as 
“secondary uncertainty”:  
 
In a rough and intuitive judgment the secondary uncertainty arising from a lack of 
communication, that is, from one decision maker having no way of finding out the 
concurrent decisions and plans made by others … is quantitatively at least as important 
as the primary uncertainty arising from random acts of nature and unpredictable changes 
in consumers’ preferences. 
 
When the acquisition (creation, sourcing) of knowledge in a firm is delegated to specialist 
knowledge workers, the firm is facing this kind of secondary uncertainty (cf. Buckley and Carter, 
1999: 82).  One possible function of KM is thus to reduce secondary uncertainty, although this is 
not one that is identified in the KM literature.  
 
2.5. Summing Up: Organizational Economics Aspects of Knowledge Management 
In the frictionless world that dominated microeconomics textbooks before the revolution in 
information, property rights and transaction costs economics about three decades ago, there are no 
problems of motivation, knowledge, information, and coordination. In this Nirvana, resources, 
including knowledge resources, are allocated in the best possible way (“first-best”). Contracts can 
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be written and enforced costlessly and information is free.  Therefore, there are no losses from 
lacking motivation, defective or missing knowledge, or coordination that goes wrong.  There are 
no problems of exchanging knowledge either, so that markets are as efficient for this purpose as 
firms are.  However, in a more realistic world, contracts are imperfect, for example, so that it is 
hard and perhaps impossible to write contracts that compensate those who “give up” (i.e. share) 
valuable knowledge; commitment (including managerial commitment) may be broken; employees 
may be held-up by management so that their incentives to invest in and share knowledge are 
harmed, etc.  Lest managers live in a Paradise or Nirvana, KM practices are subject to these 
incentive costs.  
 
The argument so far is therefore that organizational economics is able to illuminate the practice of 
KM in important ways.  In particular, by focusing on incentive compatibility problems, particularly 
as these relate to issues of investing in the production and sharing of knowledge, organizational 
economics identifies important, but hitherto neglected incentive costs and benefits of KM 
practices.  This is the reason why organizational economics should be seen as an indispensable part 
of the disciplinary foundation of KM. In the following section we deal further with processes of 
knowledge creation and integration in an organizational economics perspective. 
 
3.  Knowledge Management: Organizational Economic Insights 
In this section, we shall more concretely apply specific organizational economics insights to two 
clearly central aspects of KM: Knowledge creation and knowledge integration.  The former 
category encompasses learning (by doing, using, being instructed, etc.) and innovation processes, 
while the latter refers to how to make best use of existing knowledge in the firm. We develop 
propositions based on organizational economics regarding how firms may stimulate investments by 
employees in firm specific knowledge, resolve incentive problems in knowledge creating teams, 
and make choices between alternative means in the integration of knowledge, including knowledge 
sharing. 
 
3.1. Knowledge Creation 
It is now almost an axiom that knowledge creation in firms lies at the heart of competitive 
advantage (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Krogh et. al, 2000).  That “firms learn,” “firms know,” 
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etc. have become commonplace expressions in much of the strategy and KM literature.iii  However, 
it is not firms as such that learn, and firms themselves do not possess knowledge.  So-called “firm 
knowledge” is composed of knowledge sets controlled by individual agents.  We stress this 
admittedly basic methodological individualist point in order to emphasize the point that by 
focusing on the level of the  individual agent, rather than the firm, organizational economics 
highlights questions that are neglected in the KM literature because much of this literature operates 
on the firm level and does not have an explicitly individualistic starting point.  
 
In particular, an organizational economics perspective directs attention to the possible incentive 
conflicts that may arise in connection with issues such as, How can employees be induced to 
making their human capital firm specific when this puts them at a risk? What are the complications 
of knowledge creation in teams?  Do individual incentives enable of impede knowledge creation in 
teams?  Etc.  Perhaps somewhat contrary to intuition, such questions are central to successful KM 
in practice and they are particularly prone to an organizational economics treatment. This is 
because processes of creating knowledge  for example, in the form of innovation projects  are 
typically risky, unpredictable (the knowledge-to-be-created can only be partly foreseen), often 
long-term, labor intensive, idiosyncratic (that is, hard to compare to other processes), and often 
require substantial human capital investments (Holmström, 1989: 309). A number of these 
characteristics are the basic stuff that contracting problems are made of.iv In the following we 
discuss a number of ways in which firms may motivate employees to expend effort in the 
production of new knowledge.  In this connection, we discuss how the return stream from such 
new knowledge is shared between the firm and the employee. Thus, the problems of motivating 
employees and capturing rents from new knowledge are two sides of the same coin. 
 
We assume throughout that a asymmetric information setting obtains, and that incentive conflicts 
are present.  To see why these assumptions are appropriate ones, consider a world where 
asymmetric information and incentive conflicts (agency problems, hold-up problems) are absent.  
Here, the interests of the various agents involved in the creation of new knowledge can be easily 
aligned.  First, employees and employers would assess the value of new knowledge in the same 
way (because information about this is symmetric).  Second, bargaining will take place 
immediately, because the symmetry of information means that there will be no strategic behavior.  
Third, the employee’s reward for any learning investments will be guaranteed, since the employer 
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will not attempt to hold-up the employee.  In a Nirvana world where both employee and employer 
access the same information on the value of ideas and each others outside options, inducing 
optimal human capital investment can be achieved by writing complete contracts. If more realistic 
assumptions are introduced, an incentive perspective on knowledge creation is particularly 
appropriate, because it stresses not only that agents making learning investments must somehow 
share in the extra surplus from those investments to be properly motivated, but also that providing 
such motivation is no easy matter under asymmetric information, possibly incomplete contracts, 
and self-interested behavior.  
 
3.1.1. Earning Rents from Knowledge Creation  
The KM literature seldom makes clear exactly how the mechanism from knowledge creation to 
new rents works. However, the resource-based view in strategic management has gone some way 
towards clarifying this by identifying a set of criteria that resources must meet to be sources of 
(sustained) competitive advantages, such as being valuable, rare and costly to imitate (Barney 
1991). Moreover, the relevant resources should not be fully mobile (Peteraf 1993). Knowledge 
assets, particularly newly created ones, are particularly likely to meet these criteria (Winter 1987). 
Given this, managers may wish to induce knowledge creation by means of providing incentives to 
employees to upgrade their own knowledge capital and by spending corporate resources on having 
employees do this (e.g., training, setting up incentives, etc.). From the perspective of the firm, 
earning rents from employee upgrading of knowledge is far from trivial.   In particular, whether of 
not firms are likely to earn rents from employees’ knowledge, depends on 1) the type of learning 
investment (e.g. firm specific or general knowledge); 2) the resolution of agency conflicts in firms 
(e.g. remuneration schemes, and promotion rules); and 3) transaction costs in labor markets (e.g.  
signaling and screening). We consider these seriatim. 
 
3.1.2. Types of Learning Investments 
Firms’ investments in augmenting the knowledge of their employees may be of two kinds, namely 
general and firm-specific ones. Both may increase an employee’s productivity, but they have 
different implications with respect to who is likely to appropriate the returns and who will carry the 
costs of the investment. General learning investments may increase an employee’s productivity in 
a range of employment opportunities. Such general investments include the learning of languages 
and generic skills, such as learning word processing programs, etc. that are equally useful for 
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current and potential employers.  Becker (1962) suggests that employees will pay for their general 
training, because in competitive markets they are the sole beneficiaries of the improvements of 
their productivity.  A firm will not pay for an employee’s learning of general knowledge, because 
of the weakness of its bargaining position after having made the investment. In contrast, the 
learning of firm-specific knowledge restricts an employee’s possibility to capture returns on this 
knowledge outside of the firm that undertakes the investment. Becker (1962) argues that to the 
extent that an employee’s productivity increase exceeds his wage increase after learning, the firm 
can earn rents even if it alone incurs the costs of firm specific learning investments. As far as such 
investments are concerned, the relative bargaining position of firms is strong because employees 
cannot credibly threaten to leave the firm to bargain for higher wages that reflect their productivity 
increase after specific learning investments. Thus, it is very likely that firms will appropriate a 
substantial part of the relevant rents. Of course, firms that undertake more specific learning 
investments will also create more rents, because the benefits (e.g., in terms of productivity or 
increased innovativeness) are larger to the firm in the case of specific than in general learning 
investments. Thus, the following refutable proposition may be put forward: 
 
P1: Firms with a high ratio of specific to general learning investments will earn and 
appropriate relatively more rents than firms with a low ratio. 
 
3.1.3  Inducing firm specific learning: Incentive Conflicts and Their Resolution 
Consider next the situation from the perspective of employees.  From their point of view, learning 
is an investment of effort for which they wish to be compensated.  Firms will have to provide 
inducements for such investments. However, as we have seen, making firm-specific learning 
investments restricts an employee’s outside employment options (and therefore his bargaining 
power), which will tend to reduce firm-specific learning investments below the optimal level. This 
is because of the incentive problem that undertaking these investments means becoming more 
vulnerable to managerial hold-ups. Resolving this problem turns on management’s ability to 
credibly signal that it will not take advantage of employees who by making firm-specific learning 
investments have put themselves at risk. An organizational economics interpretation of (beneficial) 
corporate culture is that it is essentially an embodiment of such signals (Kreps, 1990).  Thus, firms 
with corporate cultures that credibly signal that management is committed to a non-opportunistic 
approach in dealing with subordinates will induce higher learning investments on the part of 
employees.  Such a corporate culture makes the provision of incentives credible, so that employees 
correctly believe that management will not renege on promises with respect to compensation.  
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With respect to the issue of providing incentives for employees’ investment in firm specific 
knowledge, organizational economics suggests at least three possibilities: High powered incentives 
(i.e., making employees more of residual claimants), promotion rules, and conferring access to 
critical resources.  Consider these in turn. 
 
High-powered incentives: High-powered incentives  often represented as the contingent portion 
of pay  may be used to induce contributions through providing larger shares of quasi-rents to 
employees (Williamson, 1996). Firm specific learning investments may be induced by providing 
equity to employees (e.g. in the firm of stock options or equity) or other high powered incentives, 
such as performance pay (Demsetz and Lehn, 1989; Williamson, 1985). However, offering such 
high-powered incentives may also lead to number of distortions. This is the case, for example, 
when the corresponding costs (e.g., of using the firms’ assets) are not borne by those to whom 
high-powered incentives are offered (Holmström, 1989). Thus, as Williamson (1985) argues, this 
is exactly why incentives in firms are often comparatively low-powered. Another problem with 
high-powered incentives is that they expose employees to considerable risks.  For example, 
performance (e.g. the value of stock options) may fluctuate for reasons beyond an employee’s 
control. In addition, employees may be highly dependent on the fixed, risk free part of their income 
if they lack alternative sources of income.  Risk-averse employees may therefore shy away from 
high-powered incentives. On the other hand, risk estimates may be in the eye of the beholder, and 
more highly skilled employees may judge risk differently from other employees. Moreover, for 
incentive pay to be effective, either observability of output or behavior must obtain. If behaviors or 
output for tasks cannot be specified as cause-effect relationships are not well understood, then high 
performance ambiguity poses a problem because neither behaviors nor outputs can be related to 
specific skill acquisition with any precision. Thus, the less output and behaviour can be pre-
specified so as to reflect employees specific skill development, the less effective high-powered 
incentives become (Ouchi, 1980). Thus, the following refutable proposition may be put forward: 
 
P2: The use of high-powered incentives to induce firm specific learning will be more 
common in firms with higher skilled, wealthier employees, and pre-specified output 
  
Promotion rules: The design of promotion rules is an alternative way of inducing firm specific 
learning investments.  Consider inducing investments in firm-specific knowledge by means of “up-
or-stay” rules  (e.g. the worker is either promoted or stays in the original job) relative to “up-or-
out” rules (e.g. the worker is promoted or fired) (Prendergast, 1993; Kahn and Huberman, 1988; 
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Gibbons, 1998).  Generally, when workers bear the costs of acquiring specific skills they will do so 
only if the wage (Ws) obtainable after skill acquisition minus their opportunity costs (Cs) exceeds 
current payment (Wus). The principal will pay the wage (Ws) only if the productivity difference 
(Ps-Pus) exceeds the difference that wage difference (Ws - Wus).  With “up-or-stay” rules principals 
distinguish jobs and attach different wages to it.  This promotion rule creates a tension between 
needing a large enough wage gap to induce the worker to invest and keeping the gap small enough 
so that the principal is willing to promote the worker after the worker has invested (Prendergast, 
1993).  Gibbons (1998: 126) illustrates this point:  
 
For example, suppose that an untrained worker produces 10 in the easy job, that a trained worker 
produces 20 in the easy job and 30 in the difficult job, and that the opportunity cost of training is 
15. Then training is efficient (30 - 10 > 15) but we cannot find wages that simultaneously induce 
the worker to invest (wage difference greater than opportunity cost, 15) and induce the firm to 
promote a trained worker (wage difference smaller than productivity difference, 30-20). As a 
consequence, employees’ investment in firm-specific skills may be low, although such investments 
would be efficient. Kahn and Huberman (1988) suggest that “up-or-out rules” can solve this 
incentive problem. For example, with this rule the principal makes a commitment to promote the 
worker after a pre-specified time span or otherwise fire him (e.g. tenure in academic jobs, moving 
up career ladders in consultancies).  Because of the resulting rat-race, this creates incentives for 
investments in firm-specific knowledge. To illustrate,  consider the example above. As before, 
specific learning investments lead to firm rents only when they are efficient (Ps - Pus > 15). If a 
worker expects promotion, he will invest at any wage (W*) which exceeds his opportunity costs 
plus best the alternative (e.g. W* > WALT +15). The principal promotes the worker if his 
productivity (Ps) exceeds his high wage (Ps > W*). Although with up-or-out rules there is always a 
wage (W*) that is low enough to induce the principal to promote the worker who has made 
sufficient investments in firm-specific capital, up-or-out rules come at a cost. Because it is not 
possible to keep the worker in the firm when the productivity after investment does not exceed his 
high salary, this up-or-out rule may waste investments in firm-specific skills. This is especially 
obvious when there are different layers where such up-or out rules apply and workers survive the 
first rounds but drop out at a higher level (cf. Gibbons, 1998).v Thus, the following refutable 
proposition may be put forward: 
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P3: Firms utilizing up-or-out rules will induce higher investments in firm specific 
human capital than firms using up-or-stay rules. 
 
Additionally, once employees have invested in firm specific capital, a firm also needs to tie 
employees long enough to the firm, so that firm specific human capital investments can be 
recouped. Turnover of key knowledge carriers is a major problem in this respect. Typically, to 
prevent turnover from happening firms use deferred rewards and pensions, which benefit 
employees only in the distant future (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
 
Providing access to assets: Firms may positively influence learning investments by conferring 
access to critical resources (Rajan and Zingales 1998), such as critical knowledge resources. 
Access may be defined as the ability to use or work with a critical resource including other human 
resources.  It provides an opportunity for employees to specialize relative to these assets.  We 
earlier analyzed this as giving rise to a potential hold-up problem, since the firm may hold-up the 
specialized employee.  However, the other side of the coin is that specialization to a critical asset in 
combination with an employee’s right to withdraw her, also critical, human capital gives her 
considerable bargaining power with respect to the sharing of the surplus from productive activities, 
that is, bargain for a higher salary. It can be shown that when investments are additive (i.e., the 
total surplus is dependent on the sum of the investments), granting access and, as it were, giving 
away bargaining power, may be a superior incentive mechanism to induce firm specific learning.  
In contrast, when investments are complementary (i.e., the marginal return of one investment rises 
in the level of the other investment), which is likely to take place in team-based firms, we are back 
to the familiar hold-up problem (Williamson 1985; Hart 1995). Not only will the employee directly 
influence the size of the surplus if she withdraws her human capital; she will also influence it 
indirectly, because her human capital investments are complementary to the human capital 
investments of other employees.  In this situation, it will not be advantageous to grant the 
employee (too much) access (see Rajan and Zingales 1998 for details). 
 
The three mechanisms above may be substitutes or complements, depending on the circumstances. 
Thus, tournaments in the form of up-or-out rules may substitute for performance pay when 
employees are sufficiently risk-averse.  Access may substitute for incentives in the same situation. 
Promotion rules and incentives may substitute for access, when giving an employee access would 
be giving her too much bargaining power.  On the other hand, all three mechanisms are often seen 
together; for example, in consultancies, partners have obtained their position through a tournament 
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that work according to certain promotion rules, they granted access to assets contingent on learning 
investments, and they are usually residual claimants. We may now put forward the following 
propositions: 
 
P4: Firms that resolve incentive conflicts in knowledge production by means of 
incentives, and/or promotion rules and/or deferred payment and/or access) will 
gain competitive advantage relative to firms that do not use these means.   
 
3.1.4.  Transaction costs in labor markets  
In the above analysis of firm-specific human capital has made the simplifying assumption that 
costs of concluding labor market transactions can be neglected. This is, of course, not the case, as 
such costs aggravate complications of inducing firm specific investments. Asymmetric information 
between current and potential employers is one source of switching costs in labor markets 
(Akerlof, 1970). Employees must search for new job opportunities and firms must search for fitting 
employees.  In this search process, there may be several complications.  For example, a current 
employer usually knows more about employees’ human capital and learning ability than potential 
employers do (Spence, 1973, 1974). In wage negotiations employees will have to credibly signal to 
new employers their ability to perform. However, because some employees will overstate their 
ability in order to drive up wages, employers will not only incur costs of screening employees, but 
may also reduce wages offered to account for the risk of picking a wrong employee (i.e., a lemon). 
If this is the case, employees willing to switch from their current employer would find the wage 
offered by new employers unattractive. The higher transaction costs in labor markets are, the more 
difficult it is for employees to switch between employers. By implication, high transaction costs in 
labor markets lower incentives for employees to invest in firm specific knowledge without 
appropriate safeguarding and compensation. Thus, firms that operate in labor markets with high 
transaction costs will incur greater costs to induce employee’s firm specific learning compared to 
firms that do not.  
 
One particular interesting way to induce firm specific learning in such situations is to offer 
employees the possibility to engage in the acquisition of certified general knowledge such as 
management training, language and computer skills (Laing, 1994). Employees might face lower 
lock-in as a result, because the acquisition of certified general skills reduces labor market 
transaction costs such as screening and matching (Spence, 1974: Barzel, 1982). Nonetheless, a firm 
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offering such general training possibilities to its employees can benefit in several ways. First, 
investments in general skills can increase the productivity effects of firm-specific skill investments 
because common knowledge between employees facilitates the combination and blending of 
specific skills (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Foss, 2001). Second, sponsoring general training as a 
form of pay also signals the commitment of employers to their employees (Kreps, 1990) that their 
investments in firm-specific knowledge will not be opportunistically exploited. Thus, the following 
refutable proposition may be put forward: 
 
P5: Firms sponsoring certified acquisition of general skills as a form of merit pay will 
induce higher employee investments in firm specific human capital.  
 
3.1.5. Complications of Providing Incentives for Knowledge Creation in Teams  
Many contributions to the KM literature recommend the use of teams in the form of work groups, 
inter-disciplinary and cross-functional teams to foster knowledge creation (e.g. Eisenhard and 
Brown, 1995, Meyer and deTore, 1999, Krogh et al., 2000). Teamwork may bring knowledge 
together that hitherto existed separately, resulting in “new combinations” (Schumpeter 1950), it 
may facilitate cross-functional communication, cross-fertilization of ideas and enhance worker 
involvement. Through the integration of knowledge of individual members, teams may not only 
blend knowledge and insights beyond what individual members may achieve; the development of 
new knowledge may also be stimulated by conversations and language-based learning in teams 
(Brown and Duguid, 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). However, while knowledge creation in 
teams has its virtues, there are special difficulties associated with aligning interests of team 
members (Scott and Einstein, 2001). Not only will teams be particularly prone to moral hazard, 
notably in the form of shirking, but the right form of incentives may also be contingent on the type 
of team at hand. Questions arise that remain neglected in the KM-literature such as, Who should be 
rewarded – teams or individuals? Who should evaluate contributions of team members – other 
team members, a specialized monitor, or an external manager? What measures of performance 
should be used and when? An organizational economics perspective suggests that the success of 
teams’ knowledge creating efforts depend, inter alia, on 1) the size of the team, 2) trade-offs 
between individual and team incentives, 3) exclusion rules, and 4) the matching varying degrees of 
uncertainty to incentive design.vi 
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Free rider problems and team size. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) provide a classic treatment of 
incentive problems in team-production   a process “… wherein individual cooperating inputs do 
not yield identifiable, separate outputs” (p.779). Where measuring individual input productivity 
and rewarding accordingly becomes difficult, team members may free-ride on other team-
member’s contribution to knowledge creation. This is so because the benefits of withholding 
marginal effort accrues to each shirking member while the resulting losses accrue to the team as a 
whole. In principle, knowledge production in teams could be organized through a set of bilateral 
agreements between team members who promise best effort and ensure mutual control. However, 
such agreements are difficult to manage and will most likely incur large resource costs; for 
example, time spent on negotiation and haggling means that less time is available for knowledge 
creation.  As teams grow in size, the larger these costs become, in fact, they increase exponentially 
with the number of team members (Rosen, 1988). In addition, free rider problems become more 
prevalent, the larger the knowledge-creating team becomes. Thus, one can derive the following 
refutable proposition: 
 
P6: Knowledge creation in teams will be less effective the larger the team size because 
shirking and free-riding will increase 
 
Individual and/or team incentives: Team size problems are aggravated if incentives are exclusively 
allocated to a team as whole rather than also considering incentives for individuals  (Laursen and 
Mahnke, 2001). When capable and willing team members are forced to support free riders, they 
often withdraw effort or else leave the team. On the other hand, relying exclusively on individual 
incentives can inhibit cooperation in teams – especially when task performance crucially depends 
on the exchange of information and mutual adaptation (Thompson, 1967; Balkin and Gomez-
Mejia, 1992). Nonetheless, many recommendations in the KM literature are mistaken when they 
note that individual rewards may be the antithesis to teamwork. An organizational economics 
perspective urges managers not to neglect possibilities to induce individual contributions on which 
team performance ultimately rests. 
 
One possibility to resolve incentive conflicts in the knowledge creating team is that a team member 
specializes in monitoring other members’ contributions to generate reliable information based on 
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which rewards may be distributed (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). A positive effect of monitoring is 
that knowledge about talents is discovered that can be used to reduce shirking but also better 
recombination or new uses of skills and talent. However, as specialized monitors become 
increasingly removed from actual teamwork, possible knowledge gaps between those creating new 
knowledge and those specializing in monitoring may increase over time to eventually compromise 
effective monitoring. As an alternative management may provide incentives for achievements of 
the group as a whole and let the group members distribute team rewards among themselves based 
on subjective performance evaluation (e.g. 360 degree reviews).x This utilizes the fact that team 
members will often have information about each other’s contributions, behavior, and ability that is 
superior to that of external management (Gibbons, 1998). Thus, specialized incentive procedures 
may cope with some of the incentive problems by combining incentives to teams with incentives to 
individual team members. This leads us to the following refutable proposition: 
 
P7: Knowledge creation in teams will be more effective in firms that use combinations 
of team based and individual incentives 
 
Exclusion rules: We mentioned earlier that firms often use promotion rules in order to solve 
incentive conflicts through setting up competition between employees.  Similar mechanisms may 
reduce incentive problems in teams. Lazear (1989) suggests that tournaments may involve self-
selection and exclusion mechanisms. These drive up effort levels, because only those are attracted 
who believe in their survival and exercise effort and skills in a team’s knowledge creation effort 
(Dillard and Fisher, 1990). In particular, giving teams the right to exclude team members (Lazear, 
1989; Malcomson, 1998) on the basis of subjective performance measures (e.g., peer evaluation, 
group leader assessment, or a combination), is clearly relevant in this context.  
 
Setting up tournaments inside firms may be a viable control mechanism in team-based knowledge 
creation. But they also have also their dangers. If tournament rules cannot exclude sabotage among 
team members they may lead to outright breakdown of knowledge creation in teams (Lazear, 
1989). An exaggerated emphasis on competition may also drive out exploration by team members 
who prefer to make quick wins through exploiting ideas of others rather than to explore new ideas 
on their own. This has two harmful effects on the knowledge creating team (March, 1994). First, 
explorers benefit from developing absorptive capacity based on which they can pick up good ideas 
that others engaged in the same team process cannot exploit on their own. The less others involved 
in the knowledge creating team are able to develop and exploit ideas themselves, the more 
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important it becomes that others can relate to their ideas. Second, as team members increasingly 
engage in exploitation to the neglect of exploration, the fewer ideas are available for exploitation. 
When competition provides disincentives for exploration and revealing ideas openly, the loss of 
relative absorptive capacity (Lubatkin and Lane, 1998) among team members diminishes the 
capacity for knowledge creation in the team as a whole.xi  Thus we suggest the following refutable 
proposition:   
 
P8: Knowledge creation in teams will be more effective the more team members are 
entitled to exclude not exploring team-members by self-selection. 
 
Uncertainty and team types:  Knowledge creating teams may operate under varying degrees of 
means and end uncertainty. To illustrate, the KM literature distinguishes two types of knowledge 
creating teams: “communities of practice” and learning in “epistemic groups.” The former denotes 
a team of peers who learn during and about the execution of pre-specified tasks with defined 
outcomes  (Lave and Wenger, 1990; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Brown, 1998).xii They key problem 
is to create knowledge about means whose ends are well known. Examples include how to fix a 
working process that has broken down, how to deal with customer demands more quickly etc. By 
contrast, “epistemic communities” deal with knowledge creation for non-routine problems whose 
ends and means cannot be specified ex-ante (Cohen et al., 1998). Here the key problem is to 
discover means for ends that are unknown at the time the team starts developing knowledge. An 
example comes from a KM team at a software security firm that described their situation as 
follows: “In 2-3 years’ time, our company will be designing security products we don’t know, 
incorporating technologies which haven’t been invented, made in processes yet to be defined, by 
people we have not yet recruited.”  
 
One complication of means and ends uncertainty is that both complicate the provision of incentives 
in team. This is because measurement bases for the provision of incentives become increasingly 
noisy the less means and end can be pre-specified ex-ante. In other words: uncertainty lead to 
performance ambiguity, which complicates the provision of incentives (Ouchi, 1980). Only if 
performance ambiguity is low performance pay seems effective in aligning conflicting interest. If 
this is not the case, variable rewards might be appropriate if pay and control can relate to specified 
behaviour or to other forms of standardisation (e.g. processes), which can serve as a basis for 
measuring performance. Unfortunately, to the extent that standardisation of behaviour or processes 
is prevented, such as in the case of many epistemic communities, neither behaviors nor outputs can 
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be determined with precision. In this case, Ouchi (1980) suggests, clan control might be the 
solution to promote cooperation and mitigate conflict of interest: the basis of control becomes a set 
of internalised values and norms. In should be noted, however, that clan control can lead to 
normative fixation and group think that are both detrimental rather than conducive to knowledge 
creation in teams (e,g, Grandori, 2001). Comprehensive empirical research regarding managerial 
control dilemmas in knowledge-creating teams remains sparse and inconclusive. However, 
contrary to popular recommendations in the literature to abandon incentives in favor of normative 
control altogetherxiii, recent evidence shows that incentives for knowledge creating teams seem to 
prevail in practice across a number of industries (Laursen and Mahnke, 2001; Foss and Laursen, 
2002). An organizational economics perspective on knowledge creation would not expect 
otherwise. Thus we suggest the following refutable proposition:  
 
P9: Teams employing combinations of individual incentives, team incentives, and 
exclusion rules will be more effective at knowledge creation than teams relying on 
clan control  
 
Nonetheless, as we move from inducing individual learning to knowledge creation in teams 
complications of providing incentives have vastly increased. Given these complications of 
knowledge creation in teams, an organizational economics perspective suggests that team based 
learning is a particular expensive knowledge creation mechanisms that is riddled with many 
problems that include but are limited to providing incentives. Seen this way, organizational 
economic insights might serve as reminder that knowledge creation in teams yields benefits at 
substantial costs. These may be compared to the benefits and costs of individual learning in firms 
as well as hiring of external expertise in form of employment or contingent work - - two alternative 
mechanisms of organizational learning (Simon, 1991).   
 
3.2.  Integrating Knowledge: Insights from Organizational Economics  
Organizational economic insights (Coase, 1937; Demsetz, 1988; Jensen and Meckling, 1992; 
Williamson, 1985) have already substantially fertilized the literature on knowledge in organization 
that characterizes the firm as a knowledge-integrating institution (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; 
Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1995).xv Therefore, this section is restricted to briefly 
review key insights on knowledge integration needs and mechanisms.xvi  
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Specialization of tasks leads to focussed learning in narrowly defined domains (Smith, 1978). 
However, because the division of tasks also leads to the division of knowledge, knowledge-
integration may be required when several activities are interdependent and individuals need to 
adapt their action to each other (Thompson, 1967). If individuals are specialized in different 
knowledge domains this will limit the rate at which knowledge that lies outside a narrow 
specialization can be assimilated, accumulated, and applied (Simon, 1945; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). Three coordination-mechanisms may be conducive to address such knowledge-integration 
problems -- direction, common knowledge, and autonomous adaptation -- but their efficacy may 
vary with varying task-dependencies at hand.  
 
Autonomous adaptation is the marvel of market. As Hayek (1945: 527) argues, markets (be they 
between or in companies) make individuals do desirable things without anyone having to tell them 
how do them. While the price mechanisms economises on investments in common knowledge, it 
only facilitates thin communication among individuals that co-ordinate their tasks and action. Its 
applicability may also be limited to situations where task-coordination is signified by low 
uncertainty and low interdependence between tasks that makes autonomous adaptation possible 
(Grandori, 2001). Moreover, pricing knowledge in exchange faces a fundamental paradox: the 
value of knowledge to a purchaser is not known until after the knowledge is revealed; however, 
once revealed, the purchaser has no need to pay for it (Arrow, 1984). Second, Arrow also argues 
that, “… authority, the centralization of decision-making, serves to economize on the transmission 
and handling of knowledge” (Arrow, 1974: 69). Demsetz (1988) agrees when he suggests that 
“[d]irection substitutes for education (that is, for the transfer of the knowledge itself).” For 
example, employees transfer reports and memos rather than the knowledge on which they are 
crafted; superiors give advice on what to do and intervene at times rather than to transfer 
knowledge on which their judgement is based. Building on this argument, Conner and Prahalad 
(1996) stress that authority not only provides a low cost method of communicating, but also allows 
the flexible blending of expertise when contingencies emerge that were not foreseeable when, for 
example, an employment contract were concluded. This nicely corresponds to Coase (1937) who 
makes co-ordination by entrepreneurial direction based on employment contracts the 
distinguishing mark of the firm as an institution. Like price coordination, direction economises on 
investments in common knowledge.  In addition direction saves communication cost not because 
communication is restricted to thin communications as was the case with price coordination, but 
because communication (be it thin or thick) is restricted to top-down interaction at particular 
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occasions. However, the application of top-down direction to coordinate knowledge, finds its limits 
when superiors do not understand what and how results are achieved at a lower level  as is often 
the case with knowledge work (Foss, 1999, 2001a). Finally, common knowledge (Grant, 1996) in 
the form of combinative capabilities, routines, shared context or codes or social capital (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992, 1996; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) may  ease 
coordination, particularly when tasks are highly interdependent. However, as a discussion of 
knowledge-codification tools illustrates, investments in common knowledge and knowledge-
sharing   both in terms of managerial effort (see Zollo and Winter, 2002) and in terms of 
aligning diverging interest (Mahnke, 1998)  is particularly expensive. Thus, an organizational 
economics perspective suggests:  
P10: Firm investing in common knowledge and engage in substantial knowledge-sharing 
only in the presence of high task interdependence will outperform firms that do so even 
under conditions of low task uncertainty. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Since its take-off in the beginning of the nineteen-seventies (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), 
organizational economics has been centrally concerned with what is very a recent recognition in 
the KM literature, namely “… that social relations and learning processes do not happen in a 
political vacuum and, on the contrary, take place in a landscape of interests and differential power 
positions and relations” (Easterby-Smith, Crossan and Nicolini, 2000: 793).   Fundamentally, 
organizational economics represents a body of theory that allows the theorist to understand the 
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nature of the obstacles to coordination within and between firms, as well as such issues as how the 
allocation of incentives and property rights influence the actions and investment decisions of 
individual agents (i.e., their human capital investments).  It does so on the basis of precise 
assumptions about technologies (e.g., team production, complementarities), the distribution of 
information, the allocation of incentives and property rights, the degree of rationality and foresight 
possessed by agents, etc.  In other words, organizational economics is taken up with the benefits as 
well as the costs of alternative contractual, organizational, and institutional structures.  It puts 
forward comparative propositions on this basis.    
 
Organizational economics advances research on KM by allowing the derivation of novel refutable 
propositions of direct relevance for the practice of KM.  We have provided a number of examples.  
More fundamentally, it provides a micro-foundation (much needed, in our view) that allows 
focused research regarding the relation between KM, value creation, and value appropriation by 
the involved stakeholders. We are confident that further research along these lines will continue to 
be fruitful. 
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Notes 
 
i Krogh et al. (2000: 122) further observe that “… search costs are the total costs incurred by an organization’s efforts 
to get individual members or a group to act effectively.” It is not so:  Search cost is a category that is entirely different 
from the incentive and coordination costs of getting “members or a group to act effectively.”  More on this later. 
 
ii We have dealt with the the issue of the boundaries of the firm in the context of  knowledge management in Foss 
(2001a,b) and Mahnke (2001). 
 
iii Part of the motivation for the interest in, and growth of, various knowledge-oriented approaches to organizations 
appears to be the widespread belief that organizational economics approaches to organizations have very little to offer 
with respect to an understanding of learning processes in firms (Kogut and Zander 1992; Madhok 1996).  This is, in 
our view, something of a misunderstanding.  It is true that organizational economics approaches do not conceptualize 
firms as knowledge-based entities per se.  However, that does not mean that it has little to offer of the processes 
whereby knowledge is created in firms. 
 
iv For example, incentives need to be provided so that agents are motivated to supply an efficient (i.e., second-best) 
level of effort, and undertake the required human capital investments; care must be exercised in connection with multi-
stage projects where the firm may wish to stop projects at a certain stage and the project leader (who may be better 
informed) may not; risk-allocation is particularly pertinent here; etc. This is not to say that understanding knowledge 
creation is trivial in the context of organizational economics  far from it.  In fact, because processes of knowledge 
creation are more uncertain in terms of the variance of the benefit distribution, and because the distribution of those 
benefits over time is harder to anticipate, than in the case of more routine investment projects, analysis is 
comparatively more complicated. 
 
v This argument holds important lessons for remuneration practices and career paths in consultancies, which employ up 
or out rules. When senior consultants do not make enough investments to be qualified as a partner, they are fired, but 
their value to the firm may exceed their value in the best alternative due to previously acquired firm-specific skills. 
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Firing thus means that firms waste firm specific investments in human capital.  Thus, although up-or-out rules may be 
better than up-or-stay rules, they are still inefficient compared to the first-best. 
 
vi A further complication obtains when intrinsic motivation is an important consideration.  In that case, high-powered 
(extrinsic) incentives may be counter-productive (Kreps, 1997).  Moreover, social comparison processes may 
complicate the situation further.  When such processes are strong, team members may be rewarded as a unit, rather 
than individually because differential individual rewards impede cooperation (Balkin and Gomez-Meijia, 1992; Jones, 
1987; Ouchi, 1980).  However, sometimes differentiated incentives may be used, particularly when it is up to the team 
itself to reward performance that team incentives might be differentiated.  Pfeffer and Langton (1997) add that 
distributive justice relates to individuals’ perception of whether they are receiving a fair share of the available rewards-
proportionately to their contribution to the group, personal risk and responsibility assumed. 
 
vii For example, Brown and Duguid (1991) in a study of informal networks among Xerox repair representatives 
illustrate how informal “war stories” about painstaking customers and unusual repairs helped its members to deal with 
situations in their daily practices that were nowhere in the official manuals of the company. Learning in communities 
of practice is task-oriented, in the sense that there is less uncertainty about what should be achieved than about how to 
achieve it. 
 
viii The difference between the concepts is that while in epistemic communities, the main goal is to develop new 
knowledge under both means and ends uncertainty, in communities of practice knowledge creation is a by-product of 
task performances and concerns means uncertainty only. 
 
x  Such exercises can be associated with 360 degree feedback mechanisms. For a review of this vast and specialised 
literature, see Borman (1998). 
 
xi In the words of March (1994: 248): “Since returns from exploration are preliminary returns from absorbing ideas 
[generated by others], those returns are insignificant if no one else is engaging in exploration. As long as nobody else 
is engaging in exploration, there is inadequate incentive for any individual participant - or potential new entrant to do 
so.” 
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xii For example, Brown and Duguid (1991) in a study of informal networks among Xerox repair representatives 
illustrate how informal “war stories” about painstaking customers and unusual repairs helped its members to deal with 
situations in their daily practices that were nowhere in the official manuals of the company. Learning in communities 
of practice is task-oriented, in the sense that there is less uncertainty about what should be achieved than about how to 
achieve it. 
 
xiii Recent contributions to the knowledge management literature have suggested to create a knowledge-creating 
atmosphere (Prusak and Davenport, this volume), to generate corporate spirit, or to enhance a climate of mutual care 
based on reciprocity (von Krogh, 1998). Additionally, appeals are made to intrinsic motivation (McGregor, 1960; 
Deci, 1975), peer recognition, or symbolic rewards such as Texas Instrument’s annual “best practice celebration and 
sharing day” (O’Dell and Grayson, 1998).  We agree. However, while these possibilities play their part in stimulating 
knowledge-creation, explicit forms of incentives may also supplement them. 
 
xiv In the words of March (1994: 248): “Since returns from exploration are preliminary returns from absorbing ideas 
[generated by others], those returns are insignificant if no one else is engaging in exploration. As long as nobody else 
is engaging in exploration, there is inadequate incentive for any individual participant - or potential new entrant to do 
so.” 
 
xv There are also several studies on product development that have argued that varying degrees of knowledge 
integration is conducive to explain firm performance (e.g., Clark and Fuijimoto, 1991, Iansiti, 1995; Hendersem 1994). 
Others suggest that patterns of common knowledge in the guise of combinative capabilities, routines, or core 
competencies are conducive in explaining differences in what firms can do well and how they perform (Hoopes and 
Postrel, 1999; Grant, 1991).  
 
xvi For a more detailed review on the relation between organizational economic insights and claims associated with a 
‘new’ knowledge-based theory of the firm see Foss (1996 a, b) and Foss and Foss (2000). 
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